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4
The Colonizing Mission
of the United States in Puerto Rico,
1898-1930
Pedro A. Caban

In the summer of 1H98 the United States allaim·d its long-standing goal of acquiring strategic insular possessions in the Pacific and the Caribbean. Moreover, with its decisive defeat of Spain, U.S. expansionists could rightly claim
that their nation had achieved imperial status. But the United States not only
appropriated far-flung exotic islands but ~dso claimed sovereignty over approximately 10 million inhabitants of the lands ceded by Spain 1 The sobering question that confronted the United States after the euphorL! of military
victory was the legal status and political rights of these subject peoples.
Eventually it devised a complicated structure of laws that prescribed a distinctive citizenship status for the subjects of each of its territorial possessions
(Smith, 1997: 428).
While the inhabitants of the territories were all perceived to he so racially
and culturally different as to justify their permanent exclusion from the
American polity, U.S. empire builders believed that effective colonial rule required that they be Americanized. Colonial administrations embarked on
ambitious campaigns to transform the legal systems and codes of Puerto
Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines and to install a program of universal public
education of which English-language instruction was the cornerstone. While
Americanization, or the colonizing mission, \Yas never a coherent policy, it
die! identify the general outlines of the institutional transform~ttion and political change that the colonial governors were expected to undertake. Colonial officials were permitted. indeed expected, to modify the content of the
Americanization programs to adjust to local conditions.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the methods and goals of the
colonizing mission in Puerto Rico during the first thirty years of U.S. rule. I
document the contradictions inherent in the mission, some of the more
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salient episodes of opposition. and ultimately the failure of the colonial authorities to attain their imperial objectives. I am more interested in specifying
the content of this program :tnd how it was related to larger imperial objectives and explaining how paradoxically it created a space for opposition than
in examining the complex history of the diverse and elaborate attempts by
Puerto Ricans to deter. modify, or benefit from the Americanization c:tmpaign.2 I discuss nvo colonial administrations that Congress imposed on
Puerto Rico. The Foraker Act, in effect from 1900 to 1917, set up a civilian
colonial administration that accelerated the tr:tnsformation of Puerto Rican
life inaugurated during the period of military occupation. The .Jones Act
modified the least democratic and most authoritarian features of the previou.'> regime but sustained its pursuit of Americanization of the subject population. Although the legislation established seemingly different structures for
colonial rule, in both regimes three departments were pivotal for carrying
out the colonizing mission of the central government during these three
decades: the Departments of Education and Interior and the Office of the Attorney General.

AMERICANIZATION AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY
~'hen

Hemy Luce prophesied the start of an ''American century-America's
century as a dominant power" in 1941, the United States bad had territorial
possessions and colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific since 1898. Scholars differ as to the reasons the United States embarked on war with Spain
over a century ago, but they concur that by the waning years of the nineteenth century the country was rapidly emerging as an economic power with
global aspirations. l:\'C'r conscious of European designs on the Caribbean
and expanded commercial presence in the Americas, the Cnited States was
determined to demonstrate to its competitors that the Western Hemisphere
was its exclusive sphere of inf1uence. An influential and highly active coalition of manufacturers and export agricultural producers lobbied for an aggressive foreign trade policy, while an ultranationalist cadre of expansionists
in government, the media, and the academy demanded decisive military action against Spain, the last vestige of European power in the Americas.
This alliance between internationalist corporate capital and an evolving imperialist state was in its infancy when the United States embarked on a war
with the decaying Spanish empire. Over a centllly later, the same array of public and private power drives the Summit of the Americas and it'l goal of neoliheral trade liberalization. The expansionism of the late nineteenth century
was built on an ideological editlce of virulent nationalist social Darvvinism. Imperialists preached that the superiority of U.S. institutions was divinely ordained and that the nation had a moral imperative to implant these institutions

The Coloni.zin.r-; ivfission o( t!w United Stoles in Puerto Rico

117

and the values they embodied throughout the hemisphere. The contemporary
justification for a U.S.-dominated regime of free trade and investment no
longer relics on racially constituted dogma. Yet it is undeniable that a celchratoty, almost chauvinistic, conviction of the superiority of the United States, particularly the democratic republicanism that is embedded in the free-enterprise
mentality, underpins the discourse on U.S.-led hemisphere globalization.
The imperialism of the late ninctecnth century required modernizing the
political institutions in the "host country" and creating the sociopolitical environment that would permit the rational implantation of capitalist production
relations (Sklar. 1988: 81). Americanization in Puerto Rico and other U.S. territorial holdings entailed very similar processes of transformation of political
institutions, property relations, and class stntcturc. The contemporary discourse on globalization underscores the indispensability of liberal democratic
political institutions because they harmonize with capitalist economic organization and practice. 3 It is a familiar argument to those who ha\·e studied the
history of late nineteenth-century and early t\ventieth-century U.S. colonial
ntle and imperialism. In Puerto Rico, colonial officials had the extraordinary
opportunity to implant those institutions and practices they believed were
necessary to effect the colony's transformation into an appendage of the metropolitan economy. While such m crt intervention has disappeared since the
demise of the Soviet Union, the political corollary of globalization is the extension of formal democratic systems-preferably the one that prevails in the
United States-because these have demonstrated their adaptability to the requirements of highly internationalized capital.
ln 1898 the United States exacted Puerto Rico from Spain as indemnillcation for having lost the war. For almost two years Puetto Rico was a '·department" under the jurisdiction of the War Department. During this brief period
of military rule the foundations for a radical and sustained transformation of
Puerto Rico·s political institutions, legal codes, and education system were
firmly established (see Berbusse, 1966; Santiago-Valles, 1994; Caban, 1999).
On May 1, 1900, the Foraker Act established a civil colonial administration in
Puerto Rico. By far the most important feature of this administration was the
Executive Council. It was to be responsible for overhauling Puerto Rico·s political and judicial institutions, installing an insular constabulary, modernizing the infrastntcture, and installing a system of public education. In the following pages I will examine three key Executive Council agencies that \\'ere
responsible for these tasks: the Depattment of Education, the Interior Department, and the Office of the Attorney General. U.S. colonial officials were
confident that the Executive Council would transform Puerto Rico's institutions and people so that the island-nation would assume ih required role in
the American century. Since Americanization entailed the implantation of
gcwernment and judicial institutions patterned on those of the l !nited States,
the Foraker Act was the first stage of the colonizing mission.
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THE IDEA OF AMERICANIZATION
The U.S. acquisition of Puerto Rico and other insular Spanish possessionsthe Philippines, Guam, and Cuba-was a unique event in the history of U.S.
territorial expansion. First, it was the result of conquest of a European nation
that had claimed sovereignty over the inhabitants of the islands for over four
hundred years. These established overseas societies possessed definable cultures, languages, values, and political systems, but they were different from
each other and each posed distinct challenges to U.S. colonial officials.
Pue110 Rico and Cuba, for example, were perceived as partially European societies, while the Pacific islands were popularly viewed as exotic and somewhat more primitive. Nonetheless, by virtue of their cultural, linguistic, and
racial characteristics the people of the former Spanish possessions were
judged inferior and would be excluded from the body politic of the United
States. U.S. colonial officials believed that through a campaign of Americanization these strange and exotic peoples would be converted into semiliterate, loyal subjects who would apprehend the legitimacy of U.S. sovereignty
and accept the new political and economic order that would be imposed on
their societies. Although they would be educated and incorporated into colonial administration and pa1tially assimilated into the norms and values of U.S.
society, they would forever be barred from full and equal participation in the
U.S. polity. Politically excluded, these possessions were nevertheless to be
fully incorporated into the circuit of U.S. production and trade as sugar producers and markets for the industrial and agricultural products of the North.
The rationale for Americanization was popularly pclltrayed as a noble and
selfless effort to bestow on the unfortunate primitive peoples the possessions and virtues of U.S. civilization. Yet Americanization was driven by a
strategic and economic calculus that was pivotal to the United States' aspirations for hemispheric hegemony and national security. Political stability and
social order were vital in these militarily strategic insular possessions. Since
the islands were destined to be either territories under de facto regulation or
formal territorial possessions for an unspecified period, their inhabitants had
to be socialized into accepting as legitimate their subordination and exclusion from the U.S. body politic. The insular possessions were quickly to take
on an important role in the remarkable expansion of the U.S. economy during the first decades of the twentieth century.
Before the war with Spain, expansionists had envisaged U.S. control of sugarcane producing islands in the Pacific and Caribbean and an escape from dependency on imported European beet sugar. By stabilizing and modernizing
the financial and revenue-generating institutions and adopting business practices and corporate legal codes from the mainland, colonial officials laid the
foundations for a rapid transition to capitalism in the underdeveloped and
war-torn possessions. Such a transformation was not merely economically
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beneficial but politically necessary since the ideology of commercial expansion closely associated capitalism with democracy. Finally, U.S. empire
builders learned from the experience of their European predecessors and
quickly moved to create an indigenous cadre of political leaders and managers who would pat1icipate in the task of transforming the colonies.
While Americanization was never more than a broadly conceived, loosely
defined conception that rationalized the necessity to transform subject peoples and their institutions in the service of empire, U.S. officials aspired to
convert Puerto Rico into a e<>mmercial bridge to Latin America and its people into ambassadors for t I.S. interests in the hemisphere. Not withstanding
these grandiose aspirations, which should be viewed with a measure of
skepticism, Puerto Rico was an invaluable strategic commercial and military
asset, and the loyalty of its people to the new sovereign had to be secured.
Americanization was predicated on belief in the superiority of Anglo-Saxon
cultural and industrial capabilities. 4 According to the Senator Albert Beveridge, a vocal ultranationalist of the 1890s, the United States was "an industrial civilization" and had reached such "a state of enlightenment and power"
that '"its duty to the world as one of its civilizing powers" was to embark on a
"period of colonial administration'· (Beveridge, 1907: 3-5). The proponents of
Americanization argued that the United States, because of its Anglo-Saxon
heritage, was the epitome of industrial modernity and possessed the most dcveloped form of republican democracy. As practiced in the overseas possessions, Americanization required English-language instruction to provide the
subject peoplcs a functional knowledge of the customs, national character,
and political principles of the nevv sm·ereign. Because it was a process specifically devised by the central government to int1uence the political behavior
and attitudes of a subject people, Americanization in the insular possessions
differed from its practice in the United States (sec Caban, n.cl.). 5 It was more
comprehensive because it called for the systematic replacement of Spanish legal systems and political institutions. The War Department, especially the Burcau of Insular Affairs, its specialized agency for colonial administration, periodically had jurisdiction over Puerto Rico, but the bureau's int1uence in
setting colonial policy was always compelling.
Although some enthusiastic officials called for the vittual er;tdication of indigenous culturc and language, others recognized that it was not only futile
but unwise to adopt such a radical approach.(' Education Commissioner Edward Falkner may well have most accurately assessed the objective of AmL'ficanization in Puerto Rico in describing it as "our national social laboratory'"
(Falkner, 190"i: 159-6()). While the process of replacing Puerto Rico·s institutions was impot1ant, Falkner believed that "the primary object of our administration in Puerto Rico should be to infuse into the political, social and economic life of the Puerto Rican people the spirit, rather than the form of
American institutions" (Falkner, 1908: 171).
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The political education of Puerto Ricans was a key goal of the Americanization discourse (U.S. Department of State, 1905: 41). Although colonial
managers never formally defined what political education entailed, they
propagated the notion that Puerto Ricans were woefully unprepared to exercise self-government. This presumed incapacity justified restrictive colonial
mle and careful oversight of Puerto Rican political behavior (see Go, 2000;
Clark, 1973). Expressing this imperial arrogance, General George Davis.
Puerto Rico's last military governor, assured Secretary of War Elihu Root that
"the knowledge which I possess of the inhabitants of this island .. forces
me to the conviction that. [self-government] would be a disaster to them and
to the be.~t interest of their fair island" (U.S. Department of War, l ()00: 75). In
1899 Root justified .~trict colonial rule by arguing that Puerto Ricans "would
inevitably fail \vithout a course of tuition under a strong and guiding hand"
0916: 203). Governor Beekman Winthrop crisply reported that ·'the work of
U.S. officials \Vas to install American institutions and American governmental
principles, and to educate the Puerto Rican on these lines" (U.S. Depattment
of State, 1905: 41). Of course, U.S. officials would ultimately decide if and
when Puerto Ricans had acquired the capabilities and temperament to exercise self-government in harmony with Anglo-Saxon principles of republican
democracy. Ironically, the goal of "educating the natives in self-government"
was stymied by the Bureau of Insular Affairs, which resisted relinquishing
its centralized control over Puerto Rico. As late as 1932, when jurisdiction
over Puerto Rico was transferred from the War Dcp:lrlment to the Department of the Interior. the Bureau of Insular Affairs asserted that it could supervise the unincorporated territories more efficiently than their inhabitants
(Clark, 197.3: 2.'\5).

THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND AMERICANIZATION

The appointed eleven-man Executive Council was a singular institution in
U.S. territorial history in that it had both executive and legislative functions.
It was the cabinet of the presidentially appointed governor and the upper
chamber of the legislature. Six of its eleven members were male citizens of
the United States, and each was assigned a cabinet post. No fewer than five
Puerto Weans were appointed to the council, although more than a decade
would pass before any \Yere put in charge of insular departrnents. Congress
felt compelled to abandon the hallowed constitutional checks and balances
here because it feared that otherwise the popularly elected lower house
would be able to impede the work of the council. This arrangement also ensured that the Americanization of Puerto Rico would be closely directed by
the central government, which virtually prohibited any Puerto Rican participation. According to William Willoughby, who served as council president,
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"The greatest freedom was given to the newly constituted government to
·work out practically every question requiring the exercise of governmental
authority." He wrote that the council constituted "the center or keystone to
the whole system" of government ( ll)Q2: 35; 1905: 98). Although the Executive Council was independent of the War Department, the Bureau of Insular
Affairs worked closely with it in implementing the colonizing mission.
While the Executive Council's mandate for transformation vv~ts sweeping
in its scope and touched virtually every area of Puerto Rican economic and
political life, three functions predominated. These I identify as ideological,
developmental, and coercive. These categories do not sufficiently convey
the diverse and contradictory tendencies and policies that characterized the
work of the Executive Council, and they were not mutually exclusive. Indeed, at times they were complementary. For example, laws favorable to foreign corporations were enacted and enforced by the attorney general and
complemented the efforts of the Interior Department to attract U.S. investment, particularly in sugar. By broadly identifying general tendencies in the
Americanization campaign, however, we can generate a clearer understanding of imperial thinking as it pertained to transforming the people of Puerto
Rico into loyal wards of the empire and incorporating the island into the metropolitan economy. The ambitious program to remake Puerto Rico's institutions and people ancl to sustain tlw operations of the colonial administration
was financed overwhelmingly from internal revenue sources.
The Department of Education was most directly involved in the ideological component of the Americanization process. One of its most important
tasks was to teach the colonial subjects the language of the colonizer. The
education commissioners set about to instill popular understanding and acceptance of U.S. norms, customs, and historical myths. They were keen to
implant a patriotic spirit and socialize Puerto Ricans into accepting the superiority of U.S. institutions and way of life (see Negr(m de Montilla, 1971; Osuna, 1949). The department was crucial in constructing and implanting a
new and alien worldview divorced from the historical context of the Puerto
Rican people's lived experiences.
The Depattment of the Interior, the director of health, and the director of
public charities were charged with developing Puerto Rico's physical and human infrastructure. The director of public charities and the director of health
were responsible for staving off mass starvation and destitution and eradicating the diseases that depleted Puetto Rico's workforce and endangered the
lives of U.S. colonial officials. Officials were convinced that investments in education and vocational and industrial training would not only improYe the material conditions of Puetto Rico·s population but result in significant increases
in the productivity of labor. Further investments in improved sanitary conditions, public health, and physical education would ensure an ample supply
of healthy and energetic workers for the emerging industries. The Interior
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Department modernized the country's infrastructure through ambitious public works projects: irrigation systems, hydroelectric plants, roads, warehouses
and piers, and a telegraph system.
The attorney general was the chief legal officer and, like the commissioner of education, was appointed directly by the president. In addition
to the attorney general, the coercive apparatus of the colonial state included the system of local courts, the bureau of prisons, the insular constabulary, the Porto Rico Regiment, and the federal district court. The
courts were directly engaged in protecting private property, enforcing
compliance with the laws, apprehending and prosecuting violators of the
law, and enforcing commercial transactions and contracts. The courts and
the body of jurisprudence that guided their conduct were among the most
important institutions for advancing the Americanization of Puerto Rican
society. Each Executive Council department employed its own staff of
workers, and collectively this bureaucracy was the primary employer of
the country's educated and professional strata. As Puerto Ricans were
hired to work in the colonial administration, they became purveyors of the
standards and values of the metropolitan power. The attorney general's
office and the courts, as well as the insular police and the Porto Rico Regiment, were important agents for socialization and legitimated the new institutional order. Hundreds of Puerto Rican lawyers and judges acquired
knowledge of a new body of jurisprudence and developed an understanding of U.S. legal codes and traditions. Thousands were trained for
service as government clerks, technicians, managers, tax assessors, police
officers, laborers, teachers, and so forth. In the midst of the increasing unemployment and widespread poverty that followed the U.S. occupation of
Puerto Rico, these workers became dependent on the colonial state for
their livelihood.

NEW LAWS AND NEW COURTS
A court system and a legal code patterned on those in the United States were
among the most important institutions for advancing the Americanization of
Puerto Rican society. Two months before General Nelson Miles landed in
Guanica, Lawrence Lowell (who would become president of Harvard University) insisted in an influential article on the importance of implanting the
"authority of American courts." It was chiefly by means of the courts and U.S.
legal codes that the people of Puerto Rico "would acquire our political ideas
and traditions" (1898: ')8). Indeed, the military governors reported that
Puerto Rico's legal system was strange and un-American and, according to
one observer, "seriously obstructed the introduction of American ideas and
methods" (Wilson, 1905: 105).
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The Foraker Act set up a three-person commission appointed by the president to compile and revise Puerto Rico's laws. By 1902 the Spanish penal
code and laws of civil and criminal procedures had been replaced with exact duplicates of the California and Montana codes. The commercial codes
were amended according to the Louisiana Civil Code, while the codes of civil
and criminal procedure were replaced with analogous legal codes from
other states (Graffam, 1986: 115; Rivera Ramos, 2001: 70). (Governor William
Hunt observed, "There is no more ready or more practical method of Americanizing our new possessions than by the enactment and enforcement of
American laws, and the introduction and practice of American jurisprudence" [U.S. Department of State, 1904: 26]).
The Office of the Attorney General wielded considerable power. The
supreme court, district courts, municipal courts, and justice of the peace
courts all reported to the attorney general. In 1915 the Executive Council established a juvenile court system to try minors under the age of sixteen. One
of the most controversial reforms was the extension of the U.S. federal district court system to Puerto Rico. The court was an important institution for
socializing the population in the norms of the U.S. jurisprudence as well.
Originally all the presidentially appointed judges were fi·om the United
States, and its proceedings were and continue to be conducted in English.
The district court was bitterly opposed by Puerto Rico's political leaders,
who saw it as an instrument of the metropolitan state to protect the interests
of its citizens against claims brought by the colonial subjects. Various attempts were made to exclude Puerto Rico from the district court system. R.
L. Rowe, an important colonial official, observed that "as a distinctly American tribunal it has done much to acquaint the native population, especially
lawyers, with the procedure of American courts" (Rowe, 1904: 212).
Although subsequently much of the original legislation was modified, the
initial alteration of the system of courts, civil and criminal law, and judicial
procedures was swift and comprehensive. The task of overhauling the legal
codes was greatly facilitated by the cooperation of the Puerto Rican Republican party. The Republicans were staunch supporters of the colonial regime
and had exclusive control of the lower house of the legislature 7 Within a
decade of the acquisition of Puerto Rico, Willoughby announced that "in no
other regard have institutions of Porto Rico existing under Spanish rule undergone so complete a change at the hands of the Americans as in respect to
judicial organization and procedure" (1905: 107). Instead, Puerto Rico had "a
complete system of practice in the courts, similar in its main features to that
existing in the code states of the United States" (U.S. Dep;utment of State,
1905: 32).
Legal reform was key to establishing a favorable investment climate, which
in turn was necessary for attracting U.S. corporations to Puetto Rico. It was
commonly argued that U.S. men of business would further the Americanization
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of the island. Spanish commercial law was revised to retkct l :.s. concepts of
corporate rights and protection. In order to establish a favorable investment
climate, the colonial state passed generous corporate tax laws modeled on
those in industrial states. Indeed, since Puerto Rico was absorbed into the U.S.
district court system, the full weight of federal legal protection was extended to
U.S. firms operating in Pue1to Rico. After these sweeping legal changes went
into effect, Governor Allen informed potential investors, "Capitalists can be assured of protection to their propetty and investments, hJUaranteed in the form
of government. in the tax laws, and in the reorganization of the courts, and capital is pretty sure to take care of it<;elf' (Wood, Taft. and Allen. 1902: 366).
During the life of the Executive Council (1900-1917) expenditures for the
coercive apparatus of the colonial state consumed about a quarter of the insular budget. Expenses for operating the penal institutions were the most
rapidly incre~tsing budget item (Caban, 1999: H1m. The rate of arrests increased over thirteenfold from 1R99 to 1905 but declined slightly by 1916,
when about 4.5 percent of the population was incarcerated (Santiago-Valles,
1994: 72).

PUBLIC EDUCATION AND
AMERICANIZATION UNDERTHE FORAKERACT
The remarkable industrial and technological advancement of the United
States during the Progressive era was popularly attributable not only to the
dynamism of the Anglo-S:txon entrepreneurial spirit hut to the system of universal public education. A.mong European governments the radical American idea that education was a right available to all ami not a privilege reserved for an :mtiquarian elite was seen as a forcL' behind the country's rapid
emergence as a world power. The British journalist William Stead extolled
the idea that "the superior education of the American common people was
the secret of their growing ascendancy." In contrast to the elitism of much of
European education, which was private and designed to preserve class privilege, the "universality of education in the United States is probably more calculated than all others to accelerate their progress towards a superior rank of
civilization and power" 0902: 148).
Government interest in vocational education, especially manual training in
the industrial :lit.~. ~tccelerated during the 1890s. By the end of the century the
United States was a world leader in the manufacturing of machinery. The
new economv demanded skilled workers, managers. and technicians, and
the high schoob were expected to provide thi.~ training. But industrialization
required the immigration of millions of Europeans, many desperately poor
and illiterate. While they provided the human labor power that fueled the industrial revolution, they also constituted a potential threat to national unity
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because of their alien political values and ignorance of the English language.
Here as well, the public education system was expected to pby a vital role.
Educators were devdoping an awareness of the centrality of public education in creating a sense of national identity among ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous European populations. State officials were also developing an appreciation for the systematic use of public education for political
socialization. The Americanization of the foreigner became a project for local and federal government. The noted educator Ellwood P. Cuhberlcy
preached widely that the public schools should take ·'on the task of instilling
into all a social and political consciousness that will lead to unity :tmong the
great diversity" (1918: 357). School authorities experimented with curricula
that not only provided vocational training hut included English-language instruction. civic education, patriotic exercises, and the transmission of values
and beliefs through the study of U.S. history.
Given the importance of education to the development of the nation, it is
not surprising that U.S. empire builders made universal public instruction the
cornerstone of their Americanization campaigns in the former Spanish
colonies. The appointments of Major John Eaton, who had served as the first
commissioner of the 1l.S. Bureau of Education, and the influential educator
Martin G. Brumbaugh ;.ts education commissioners demonstrated that Puerto
Rico would be an impo11ant laboratory for testing the latest education theories--enculturation. vocational training. language acquisition, ami political
socialization. The education commissioner was appointed directly hy the
president and given unrL'strictccl authority to design and administer Puet1o
Rico's public education system. The I)epartment of Education was entrusted
with the task of transforming a Spanish-speaking people with a four-hundredyear history and distinct culture into patriotic subjects conversant in the language of the colonizers, familiar with their political values, and trained for
work in the new economic order. In addition, education officials tested the
applicability of industrial arts, vocational training, and other manual education programs in Puerto Rico.
The department's mandate was extensive: (1) imparting English-language
skills, (2) instilling civic values, patriotism, and adherence to the colonial
regime, (3) training Puerto Hicans for managerial, supervisory, 'and technical
positions in gm·crnment and industry, ( 4) installing a gender-b;tsed educttiona! program in \Vhich women WL're socialized and trained to perform
tasks that would preserve the traditional male-centered family, (S) prm-icling
job-related skills in manual and industrial trades for the boys and nL·edlework and domestic service for the girls, (6) preparing a select group of
Puerto Ricans to assume high-level administrative positions in the government, and (7) conducting physical education and hygiene instruction.
The significance assigned to these various goals depended upon the priorities of the education commissioners. Invariably instruction emphasized

L

126

Pedro A. Cahan

instilling in youngsters a work ethic that was in harmony with the anticipated
labor requirements of a new corporate order, as well as providing political
socialization that emphasized the superiority of U.S. governmental organization and institutions. U.S. officials felt that the public education system would
build loyalty for the United States by generating increased employment and
earning power among the poverty-stricken rural population. An early gm·ernment report noted the public schools were "organized to provide training
for good citizenship, and one of the first essentials is that the individual slull
be so trained as to support himself and those dependent upon him" (U.S. Department of State, 190:\: 265). The increased earning ctpacity attributable to
education and training would, according to one educltion commissioner,
"convert our rural people into citizens capable of maintaining the sovereignty of the state·· (quoted in Negron de Montilla, 1<)71: 153).
School officials passionately enforced English-language instruction, and
many considered this the department's most imponant educational task. Indeed. according to Commissioner Bmmbaugh, ''The first business of the Atnerican republic ... is to give these Spanish-speaking races the symbols of the English language in which to express the knowledge and the culture which they
already possess" (Bmmbaugh, 1907: 65). Implicit in all this, of course, was the
deeply prejudicial view that English-speaking peoples were the custodians of
democracy and enlightened republicanism. Over the decades thousands of
teachers were recruited in the United States and brought to the island to teach
English to the students and teachers. In 1904 the Depanment of Education hired
120 teadwrs from the llnited States to provide English-language instmction
(U.S. Department of StalL'. 1904: 16). In 1917. 193 teachers came from the
United States ( l i.S. Department of War, 1917: 461 ).
School officials aspired to educate an indigenous political elite that would
be at the serdce of the colonial government. They emphasized the necessity
of instilling "civic virtues" among members of Puerto Rico's "upper class,
from which must be drawn the directors and administrators of public affairs."
To this end, scholarships for young Puerto Rican men and women were provided in 1900 as "part of the plan for instituting Atnerican culture ami American educational ideas into Porto Rico" (U.S. Department of State, 1903: 157).
They would return to Puerto Rico to assume the role of ambassadors of the
new sovereign and, with their newly burnished status as cosmopolitan and
educated coloniab. legitimate the material and social gains to he achieved by
passively submitting to the assimilationist credo of Americanization. Racist
constmctions of Puct1o Eicans as falling shot1 of the v~tstly superior AngloSaxon intellect were at the core of American percL~ptions regarding the ability of Puerto Eicans for advanced education. According to key officials, the
type of instruction that \Vas required in Puerto Rico was "primarily and essentially one of training rather than of education, of character-building rather
than scholastic instmction" (Willoughby, 1909: 162-65). While Puerto Ricans
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lacked the innate cerebral capabilities for abstract thought, they could be adequately trained to mimic the colonizer and perhaps learn to appreciate its
higher moral character.
U.S. education officials understood that the school system had an explicit
ideological role in the imperial project; it was, after all, an agency of Americanization. These men regularly organized activities and educational programs to foster patriotism for the United States. Commissioner Brumbaugh's
first report emphasized the centrality of patriotic exercises in the curriculum.
Rev. James H. Van Buren, the Protestant Episcopal bishop of Puetto Rico for
over a decade (1902-1912), went so far as to write that "loyalty to American
principles and standards is a leading feature of the public school curriculum
in Porto Rico" (Van Buren, 1913: 151-52). Educational attainment was promoted as essential for fostering responsible citizenry. Elihu Root insisted that
Puerto Ricans were incapable of self-government because of their Spanish
cultural legacy and lack of education. The electoral franchise, he argued,
should be limited to the minuscule percentage of the male population that
was literate. He felt that with universal public education men "should acquire
the suffrage on this basis as soon as they are capable of using it understandingly" (1916: 167). Paradoxically, he also endorsed the franchise for males,
literate or otherwise, who paid taxes to the insular treasury. Root and others
entertained grandiose aspirations to mold Puerto Rico's people into a bilingual community and convert the island into "a liaison point between English
speaking and Spanish speaking America" (Clark et a!., 1930: 90).
Officially, one of the objectives of the public education system was to prepare Puerto Ricans for eventual self-government. However, since educational instruction seldom went beyond the sixth grade for the vast majority
of Puerto Rican children, the capacity for the society to exercise self-rule
could not be demonstrated. Ultimately, it would be Congress that would determine whether Puerto Ricans would be granted the autonomy to conduct
the affairs of state within their own country. Universal literacy was never a
condition for admittance of territories as states into the union or, indeed, for
individual states to govern within their boundaries. In reality, public education was perceived as a fundamentally conservative influence that would
counter what were perceived as radical tendencies among the poor and illiterate rural and urban working class. Colonial officials were implanting a system of education that almost a century later Howard Zinn would refer to as
"education for orthodoxy and obedience" 0992: 258).
Despite the goals of colonial officials and despite the fact that it consumed over a third of the insular budget, the system of public education
failed both to prepare a literate and patriotic citizenry in sufficient numbers, and to produce young men and women with the skills that industry
demanded. English-language instruction was consistently challenged by
Puerto Ricans, who recoiled against the often crass and insensitive attitudes
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of school officials (see Negron de Montilla, 1977). In 1915 the commissioner
of education reported that the deplorable material conditions of the population were hazardous to colonial rule and could not be mollified by the educational system, whatever its effectiveness as a socializing agency. The
commissioner observed with alarm, "The enormous mass of illiterates, in its
primitive, uncured condition, is not safe timber to build the good ship of
state. We realize that there are serious social and economic problems that
have to be solved before the people of Puerto Rico reach the desired goal"
(U.S. Department of War, 1915: 316).
The educational process in Puerto Rico was imbued with the ideological
vision of exercising direct domination over the colonial subjects by persuasively devaluing and diminishing their identity. The everyday representation
of Anglo-Saxon civilization as a desirable but ultimately unattainable goal for
the inferior colonial subject was a conscious device for holding Puerto Ricans in a permanent state of subjugation. Referring to British imperial exercise of ideological domination in India, Edward Said called this "the quotidian processes of hegemony" (1993: 109).

BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC EXPANSION
While public education harbored an explicit ideological project, it had an immediate and pragmatic goal as well. The Department of Education had a definite role in advancing Puerto Rico's conversion into a dependent of the metropolitan economy. The curriculum was designed in part to teach
rudimentary skills and help turn out a healthy and obedient labor force for
an economy dominated by sugar and tobacco production and needlework.
In the decision to employ public education to develop the island's human
resources, two factors were probably decisive. First, such programs had been
developed and employed with some success in a number of industrial states,
and their adoption in Puerto Rico seemed appropriate given the anticipated
direction of economic growth. Second, Puerto Rico had a demonstrated capacity as a sugar and tobacco producer and a "superabundance of labor." In
fact, it was purportedly endowed with such a bounty of natural agricultural
resources that one excited official was motivated to utter the preposterous
claim that "the inhabitants can ... exist without any remuneration" (U.S. Department of War, 1900: 36). Because of this "abundant labor force ... Puerto
Rico had a decided superiority over its natural competitors," [Cuba, Mexico,
and Central America], "in the most essential element of industrial prosperity"
(U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, 1907: 10). But these same officials
cautioned that Puerto Rico lacked the entrepreneurial talent and business
acumen to develop industrially. The first colonial governor agreed that the
country had "plenty of laborers and poor people generally" but what it des-
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perately needed was "men with capital, energy, and enterprise to develop its
latent industries ... and make the country hum with the busy sound of commerce" (U.S. Department of State, 1901: 75).
Official reports portrayed a languorous island patiently waiting for its vast
pool of labor to be efficiently exploited by these "men with capital." Dreams
of a vast productive pool of labor were confounded by the reality that 90 percent of the population was afflicted with hookworm, a debilitating intestinal
disease. Puerto Rico could not hope to develop industrially unless the deplorable health and sanitary conditions of the population were dramatically
improved. Driven by a combination of humanitarian, strategic, and economic considerations, the colonial government set about to improve sanitation and health conditions. Accordingly, the government initiated a campaign to "stamp out the disease" in order to succeed in the "rehabilitation of
the physique of the Puerto Rico laboring people" (U.S. Department of State,
1904: 28). The school system was recruited into this campaign to provide instruction on personal hygiene, sanitation, and nutrition as part of the larger
campaign to eradicate hookworm. The epidemic-like status of hookworm
persisted until the 1940s.
Employment opportunities for the island's impoverished masses did not increase during the steady transition to a corporate-dominated, export-oriented
economy. In fact, in 1915 the Commission on Industrial Relations reported that
"unemployment was very prevalent in the Island" and estimated that there were
between two hundred thousand and three hundred thousand more workers
available than jobs (Puerto Rico, Bureau of Labor, 1916: 9). According to the Bureau of Labor, "It may be said beyond any doubt that the most serious labor
problem of Porto Rico . . . is unemployment. . . . It is absolutely necessary to
take some steps . . . to diminish the great evils of unemployment" (U.S. Department of War, 1915: 428). Yet these same oftlcials reluctantly had to acknowledge that the school system had failed to educate a self-reliant population with marketable skills for new labor markets. A special commission
reported as early as 1912 that "although the Island schools are unquestionably
helping to make good citizens, it is a grave question whether the present
arrangements contribute materially to the making of home-makers, producers,
skilled workers, self-reliant and eftlcient breadwinners" (cited in Clark et al.,
1930: 83). Remarkably, despite the demonstrated inability of the education system to impart vital skills to the rural population and tl1e documented failure of
the corporate sector to absorb the massive surplus of labor, school authorities
continued to request additional allocations for programs of dubious social
value. In 1916, despite official acknowledgment of a surfeit of workers in virtually all labor categories, Commissioner Miller repotted, "There is a demand for
skilled labor-and unless industrial education is emphasized for the express
purpose of training artisans skilled in various trades, serious labor troubles will
probably ensue" (U.S. Department of War, 1916: 357).

....
130

Pedro A. Caban

Making healthy and reliable workers was an important component of the
colonizing mission, but the Executive Council had a mandate to transform
the physical landscape in preparation for a rapid transition to corporatedominated export agriculture. In 1898 Puerto Rico's physical infrastructure
was rudimentaty and incapable of suppot1ing a modern agricultural export
economy. The council pursued the task of modernizing Puerto Rico's primitive and collapsing infrastructure with single-minded determination. It
granted exclusive franchises to U.S. firms to build and maintain the roads and
transportation, communications, and related facilities essential for economic
development. Using the \Var Department as it<> fiscal agent, the colonial state
issued bonds to gener~1te millions of dollars in loans to finance this ambitious
undertaking. A pattern of extensive colonial state engagement in sustaining
a cheap, publicly financed and subsidized infrastmcture \vas established
during the coutKil's se\ en teen-year life.
Puerto Rico's commercial development depended upon making the fertile
interior of the country accessible to commerce and expanding the opportunities for the agricultural exploitation of these regions. Road constmction
and maintenance became the single most important-and costly-component of the ambitious program to rebuild Puerto Rico's infrastmcture. According to Governor Allen, "It is an imperative necessity to devote every dollar which can be spared from the surplus revenue to the constmction of
permanent roads" (lJ.S. Department of War, 1901: 73). By 1910 approximately a thousand kilometers of first-class roads hac! been built, almost four
times the amount built by the Spanish (RiguaL 1967: 90). Road construction
and maintenance v..·as the Interior Department's largest single expenditure in
1912, consuming over half of the department's budget and about one-tenth
of all funds disbursed by the insular government (calculated from U.S. Department of War, 1912: .:)23-24).
The ambitious road construction and maintenance program helped
dampen the acute unemployment problem, but the demand for jobs among
the unemployed "was so great many have to be refused." Those fortunate
enough to get hired received "30 cents per day-a small amount, but doing
a great deal of good" (U.S. Department of War, 1901: 328). However, even
these paltry expenses for labor were considered excessive as constmction
costs for the road-building program threatened to consume a dangerously
large share of the state's revenues. In 1903 the clepa11ment terminated the
program to hire day laborers as a way of temporarily alleviating unemployment, but road building was too important for economic and military security to scale back. The agency sought to resolve its budgetary problems by
relying on convict labor \vherever possible as a cost-cutting measure, this despite the fact that unemployment hovered around 20 percent. The governor
applauded the success of the convict labor program and its cost-efficiency.
"Prisoners ... are paid a wage of '5 cents per day," which amounted to "less
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than one fourth the wage paid free labor" (U.S. Department of War, 1914:
307) In 191 "i the attorney general also happilv reported that the convict labor program had saved the treasury over ~76,000. about 10 percent of what
the colonial government spent on salaries (calculated from lJ.S. Department
of War, 1915: 33, 262). Prison maintenance expenses \vere amply reimbursed
by the savings realized with com ict labor. Given the profitability of this venture, the governor authorized the Interior Department to employ convict labor for road construction whenever possible. Despite its preference for imprisoned labor, the department reluctantly had to employ free wage labor,
but, mindful of the wage structure in effect in the plantations, the government capped the daily pay of common laborers hired by state agencies at 45
cents. The law equalized wages in order ··ro protect the coffee and sugar districts from the loss of labor consequent on the payment of greatly increased
wages hv the government'' (C.S. Depattment of War, 1904: 23 ).
The de\·clopment of the sugar industry was an integral part of the U.S. colonizing mission. However, large-scale commercial sugarcane cultiv:ltion
could not be undertaken profitably in the southern coastal plains. since the
area lacked adequate water and rainl~lll. In 1908 the legislature authorized
construction of an cxtensi\'e irrigation system for the region. This project was
directly beneficial to the United States, according to the chief engineer, because the country depended '·heavily on Puerto Rico for its supplies of rmv
sugar" (U.S. Depal1ment of State, 1908: 184). The irrigation system became
operational in 1914 and supplied water to twentv-four thousand acres in the
southern coastal plain of Guayama (U.S. Department of War. 1911: 42). Naturally, sugarcane acreage prices soared, given rilL' increased yields and reduced risk. In Guayama the value of cane land jumped from $99 in 1907 to
between $350 and $400 an acre in 1917 (U.S. Department of State. 190?): 7 (J:
US Department of War, 1917: 336). The large sugar corporations \Vcre the primaty beneficimies of the new irrigation system. Small sugar producers. burdened by high property taxes, monopoly prices for railroad transit. ami expensive imported fertilizers and other inputs, were highly motivated to sell
their land to the U.S. absentee corporations that began to invest in the area.
Guayama became one of the districts most characterized by the concentration of productive assets by absentee corporations.
The sale of insular bonds was routinely arranged hy the Bureau of Insular
Aff:tirs of the \\Jar Department to obtain quick infusion.s of capital to finance
public works projects. The purchasers of insular government and municipal
bonds realized substantial earnings on these bonds, which were backed by
the U.S. Treasury Department. As early as 1911 the total insular and municipal bond indebtedness for ruad construction and irrigation projects was $5.3
million-an unusual level of debt considering that the total receipt.s in th:1t
year \VLTC S6.8 million (U.S. Department of War, 1911: 41, 304). The colonial
state·s ddJt continued to increase and by I() I?) had doubled, reaching $10.8

132

Pedro A. Cahan

million (Clark et al., 1930: 326). The state turned to the bond market because
it could not generate the necessary revenues to sustain the frantic pace of infrastructure development. However, debt financing had serious consequences for long-term development. The Brookings Institute reported that
the bonowing policy had ·'been definitely harmful." It warned that "borrowing has been a great waste of public revenue by diverting it to the payment
of interest, while the piling up of debt charges is almost certain to cause
hardships for the country during future periods of reduced prosperity'' (Clark
et a!., 1930: 5(Jil).
In 1()l (J the colonial :tel ministration realized that the revenue shortfall was
jeopardizing its oper:ttions. Governor Yager warned that ''the only solution"
to the revenue prohkm was ''to increase the tax on th<: property of the island
which rccciH·s most of the benefits of government. and whose owners are
the most able to pay for this support." He informed the legislature that "an
unusually large percentage of the property of the island is owned by nonresidents," and he criticized "these absent owners" because "they contribute
practically nothing to the insular government which has done so much for
them. The increase in the value of their property is almost wholly clue to the
improvements furnished by, and the fostering care of, the insular government'' (U.S. Department of War, 1917: 261). Despite this generous treatment,
the absentee sugar corporations delayed or refused to pay taxes and dTcctively orchestr~tted a tax boycott by engaging the government in protracted
legal battles to block enforcement of the tax laws.
By 191 H an infrastructure had been built that included thmt.~ands of kilometers of roads, irrigation systems, clams and hydroelectric projects, railways
and tramways, telegraph and telephone systems, and ports-many financed
and built by till' colonial state. These utilities were mali<: r<:adily available to
absenree sugar corporations, often at highly subsidized rates. Puerto Rico's
trade profile was altered as the island became a small but important market
for industrial goods and technology that were used to build and maintain the
infrastructure. Infrastructure development also facilitated the den:ttionalization of productive assets by reducing the entry costs to U.S. firms-by lowering the costs for energy, transportation, and communications. Moreover,
this early pattern of direct colonial state financing of infrastructure development is one of the permanent features of capitalist development under colonial management.

OTHER INSTITUTIONS FORAMERICANIZING PUERTO RICO
The U.S. Army :md the American Federation of Labor (AFL) were other institutions actively engaged in Americanizing Puerto Rico. In March 1899 an
army battalion of Puerto Rican volunteers was formed under the command
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of U.S. army officers. According to U.S. officials, the Puerto Rican Regiment
was an important institution for promoting the Americanization of the island.
Army training was said to impose the "mental and moral discipline which
comes from unremitting enforcement of those rules of conduct without
which industrial and moral progress are impossible" (Rowe, 1901: 335). Even
before the United States had invaded Puerto Rico, the Harvard law professor
A. Lawrence Lowell had recommended that "natives of the island be recruited into the ranks" of the army and the navy because it was "a potent
force in fostering the affection of the people of Puerto Rico for the United
States. There is certainly nothing that stimulates loyalty to a flag so much as
serving under it" (1898: 59). Governor William Hunt was "certain that the organization of the Porto Rican provisional regiment has been of material aiel
in the general work of education. Its existence has stimulated patriotism and
aroused a pride in the honor of the flag" (U.S. Department of State, 1903: 15).
By 1900 the AFL was involved in the Puerto Rican labor scene. Puerto
Rico's largest labor organization, the Fecleraci6n Libre de Trabajadores (Free
Federation of Labor-FLD was an affiliate of Samuel Gompers's U.S. labor
federation. In Puerto Rico as in the United States, the AFL effectively depoliticized industrial labor relations and focused workers' demands on immediate economic struggles. Under its guidance the FLT accepted the premise that Puerto Rico's workers should limit their demands to negotiating
improvements in their material conditions within the industrial and political
order imposed by the United States. To the extent that the workers were invested in collective bargaining with the employers and not confronting the
agencies of the state that protected corporate interests, the FLT and the AFL
allayed opposition to colonial rule. Indeed, according to Governor George
Colton, by 1916 the AFL "was the most effective factor in Americanizing the
people of Porto Rico" (U.S. House, 1924: 82). Samuel Gompers boasted that
"there is no factor that has been of such value in Americanizing the people
of Porto Rico than has the American labor movement, the American Federation of Labor" (U.S. Senate, 1916: 114, 113).

UNIONSANDTHE POLICE
In March 1908 the Insular Police Service was established and placed under
the general supervision of a three-person police commission appointed by
the governor. The colonial authorities justified the routine deployment of the
insular police during militant labor strikes as necessary to protect the property of large landowners. The political consequences of establishing a constabulary of poor Puerto Ricans under the direct command of the governor
and commanded by a U.S. military officer were significant. Puerto Ricans in
the employ of the colonizers were charged with preserving the very structure
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of property relations ami social authority th:1t was provoking widespread
militancy.
As early as 190'5 the police were ordered to handle "a strike situation in the
sugar districts:· hut the most extensive and militant strikes broke out bet\\ ccn 191 ') and 1916. when eighteen thousand workers brought twenty-four
of the thirty-nine largest plantations to a h:dt for three months (rleagle, 1917:
1 lcJ). The director of bhor observed th:ll the strike of agricultur:1l workers
"has been considered the most important in Pue1to Rico since the American
occupation,. (U.S. Department of War, 1915: 42/i l. These strikes were also
among the most violent of the first two decades of colonial rule. Officials reported that •·fires occurred :md other kinds of damage were clone all over the
island during that period"' and the ''work or the police force was considerably
increased during the JXlSt year by the strike· oi' agricultural \\·orkers which began in January'' (U.S. Depattment of War, 1915: 425; 1916: 18).
During these particularly violent strikes, many of the cane fields were
torched and machinery and buildings destroyed by workers. Governor Yager
reported that he "could not ignore the appeals for protection against such
acts of lawlessness :mel disorder" (U.S. I kpartment of War. 191 ): 36). In the
ensuing battles police killed five workers in Vieques and another in Ponce,
dozens were wounded, :mel over three hundred workers vnTe arrested (Iglesias Pantin, 19)8: 188-89). Reports leave little doubt that the police used excessive force in suppressing these strikes.
Faced vvith uncompromising hostility from the sugar corporations and unresponsive colonial authorities, the FLT called on the AFL to come to its defense. The AFL successfully pressed its supporters in Congress to establish an
industrial relations commission to investigate state violence against the strikers. According to the commission, the series of strikes "which began in January, 191 ), \Vas not only justified but was in the interests of the progress of
the island. The long hours, low wages, and exploitation of laborers could not
ha\c been relieved except by organized action" (Marcus. 1919: 19). The
commission concluded that the insular police were primarily responsible for
the ,-iolence and criticized the actions of the local police magistrates (Mejias,
1946: H7). The labor bureau critically observed that "whatever the actions of
the strikers may have been, there cannot be any justifiable cause for the actions of the police and of the municipal authorities," who "violated the incliviclual rights of the strikers. often times treating them with unforgivable brutality" (Santiago- v~dles. 1'Nl: 114).
The FLT applied for fc·deral governrnent intervention to constrain the exploit.ltive practices of the corporations, while inculpating the colonial authorities for violating the rights of workers, but at no time did it repudiate the
sovereignty of the United States. In fact, it supponecl annexation for Puerto
Rico because it believed only if it were a state in the union would workers
be protected by federal Llhor legislation and constitutional guarantees.
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THE JONES ACT: THE SECOND COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

In 1917, after almost two decades of growing Puerto Rican frustration with
the Foraker regime, Congress voted into law Puerto Rico's second organic
act. The Jones Act was a wartime emergency measure enacted by Congress
on the eve of t:.S. entry into \X!orld War I. The imposition of political calm
and loyalty in this troublesome insular possession was a crucial security objective for the United States a.~ it made preparations for war in Europe. The
metropolitan government sa\v the persistent challenges by Puerto Rico·s
dominant political party and other <:lites and increasing popular opposition
to the colonial regime, particularly to the Executive Council, as evidence of
the growing appeal of independence. The United States believed that the
Jones Act would mollify these disgruntled voices while reasserting its imperial dominance over the island and its people. The Jones Act centralized
power in the office of the governor and mandated continued U.S. presidential appointment of the commissioner of education and the attorney general.
A Justice Department was established under the authority of the attorney
general, who continued as the chief law enforcement officer and 3dministrator of the system·s penal administration and control. Nonetheless, the
Jones Act was portrayed as an enlightened measure that significantly liberalized the colonial regime by eliminating the despised Executive Council and
establishing a popularly elected upper house.
The Jones Act signaled the end of the aggressive Americanization C3mpaign and introduced a new phase in the colonizing mission. Policy makers
abandoned any serious idea they may have entertained regarding the use of
Puerto Rico as a social laboratory for Americanization. After 1917 the goals
of U.S. colonial rule in Puerto Rico were influenced by the island's changing
economic and strategic roles in the American empire.
Puerto Rico emerged as an important sugar producer for the U.S. market
and evolved into an even more crucial geo strategic asset during World War
I. The European war had devastated sugar beet production and led to worldwide sugar shortages. Suddenly, the sugar-producing insular possessions of
the United States became extraordinarily important to a U.S. economy that
was becoming increasingly internationalized. As a result of escalating demand for sugar and tropical products, Puerto Rico became a particularly lucrative investment .site for U.S. absentee firms. The inter-war period severely
tested the abilitv of the United States to administer Puerto Rico pc:tccfully. By
1932 mass sectors of the population languished in deplorable poverty ancl
enervating disease and malnutrition. Puerto Rico's condition glaringly exposed the fallacy of economic theories that equated capitalist development
with social equity. Consequently, Washington's goals in Pue1to Rico were to
preserve political stability, contain labor militancy, and defend the tarnished
legitimacy of colonial rule.
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The ]one,~ Act is best kncJwn for conferring collecti\ c U.S. citizenship on
the people of Puerto Rico. This grant of citizenship was novel because it
gave Puerto Ricans few of the political and civil rights accorded native-born
or naturalized citizens of the United States (see Smith, 1997; Cabranes, 1979:
96). According to General Macintyre, chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs,
the purpose of granting citizenship to Puerto Ricans was "to make clear that
Porto Rico is to remain permanently connected with the United States" ("l:.s.
Department of War, 1916: 18). The grant of citizenship did not augment the
already extraordinary plenary powers that Congress exercised over Puerto
Rico and its people. hut it did have the perverse psychological impact of dramatically demonstrating t:.S. resolve to retain Puerto Rico as a colonial appendage.
Remarkably, while the Jones Act conferred collective naturalized citizenship on Puerto Ricans, it did not require literacy or t1uency in the English language. Nonetheless, the public schools intensified English-languag..: instmction in order to further the civic education of Puerto Ricans. Moreover, given
the collapse of the insular labor market, public schools became immediately
engaged in preparing a barely literate population for self-employment and
petty commodity production. By the early to mid-1920s the colonizing mission, heralded with almost evangelical fervor as a moral campaign destined
to elevate a dependent and inferior people to the status of Anglo-Saxon civilization, was e,~sentially abandoned as an ideological project.

THE SCHOOLS AND CAPITALISM
Although corporate profits increased during and after \v'orld War I, Puerto
Rico's econonw degenerated into a morass of poverty and social immiseration that demonstrated the failure of the United States, despite its great
wealth, to provide its colonial ward with economic security and social justice. By the 1930s corporate domination of the economy had provoked a social crisis that threatened the stability of Puerto Rico. Unemployment, landlessness and disease were so extensive as to place U.S. strategic and political
objectives at risk The supert1uity of labor for capitalist production was one
of the more serious potential challenges to social stability. The federal government \Vas acutely aware of the unfolding social crisis in the isbnd. Colonial officials repeatedly commented on the depres,~ed wages that kept workers at barely subsistence levels and worried that unregulated market forces
would create an unmanageable social crisis.
Puerto Rico experienced the brunt of the global deprc,~sion of the 1930s.
Salaries declined as the cost of imported food increased, and unemployment
climbed. Absolute levels of poverty, malnutrition, landlessness, and disease
escalated. Governor Theodore Roosevelt Jr. reported in 1930 that "more than
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60 percent of our people are out of employment, either all or part of each
year" (U.S. Department of War, 1930: 2). Congressman Johnson alerted his
colleagues in 1930 that "the distress in Porto Rico among those citizens of ours
is almost beyond words to express. More than 600,000 people of Porto Rico
are woefully undernourished. . . . They work when they can, but there is so
little work at so little pay-pennies not dollars" (U.S. House, 1930: 11345).
Even for those lucky enough to find work, wages were often too low to meet
their minimum needs. Governor Towner reported that "since 1915 the cost of
the sugar laborer's diet has increased 48.6 percent, while his wages have increased but 26.5 per cent. . . . The fact remains that for agricultural laborers
the wages paid have not increased as rapidly as the cost of living" (U.S. Department of War, 1925: 35). Puerto Rico's working population was not only
poor but sickly and malnourished. Governor Roosevelt observed that the
"death rate in this disease [tuberculosis] was higher than that of any other
place in the Western Hemisphere, and four and one-half times the death rate
in the continental United States" (U.S. Department of War, 1930: 1).
The public education system, after all, was supposed to prevent such conditions. The unconscionable unemployment levels, while ultimately a function of market forces, did expose the fiction in government declarations regarding the success of the education system. After decades of significant
expenditures, which consumed almost a third of the insular budget, government officials were forced to admit that massive illiteracy continued to
plague the population. In 1931 less than half of the 483,348 school-aged children were enrolled in the public schools, and of those enrolled in the rural
schools 83 percent dropped out before completing the fourth grade. Since
vocational training began in the second-unit schools, that is, after the sixth
grade, only a small percentage of the rural children received adequate industrial and vocational instruction. According to officials, the literacy campaigns amounted "only to a smattering of the rudiments of an education
which will probably wear off very soon after the children leave school" (U.S.
Department of War, 1931: 69).
Despite these sobering assessments, colonial officials continued to dream of
molding Puerto Rico's people into a bilingual community that would serve as a
bridge between the United States and Latin America. Juan B. Huyke, the first
Puerto Rican education commissioner, reported that bilingual education was
emphasized because "Porto Rico is about halfway between North and South
America," and it was a "proper location ... for training of student<> for the important work of uniting the Americas" (U.S. Department of War, 1929: 375). By
the mid-1920s the University of Puerto Rico envisioned itself as a pan-American
university with specific diplomatic and economic responsibilities. The university was "to lend to the leaders in extra-governmental activities in North, Central and South America the bilingual, bicultural, and intercontinental resources
of Potto Rico" (quoted in Rodriguez Fraticelli, 1991: 155).
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By 1931 the hypothesized positive relationship between economic
growth, increased demand for trained workers, and higher wages was severely shaken. The economy continued to demand contingents of cheap, relatively unskilled rural labor for employment in the sugar industry as field laborers. Even in the needlework industry, whose relatively skilled workers
were trained in the public schools, wages were very low. The pool of unskilled labor required for the sugar-dominated corporate sector readily exceeded demand. The synergy between industry and the school system that
had been advocated as a critical function of public education had essentially
collapsed by the end of the 1920s. The education commissioner candidly admitted that "the effotts put forth in the past in the direction of vocational education have f~1ilcd in many cases'' (U.S. Department of War, 1931: 76).
Faced with the magnitude of the economic crisis of the early 1930s, the
schools attempted to impart skills and knowledge that would assist impoverished families in their struggle to survive. A priority for the system was educating young people in some rudimentary skills so that they could exercise
a measure of control over their lives in an economy that had left them behind. Programs in the common schools were expanded to train young people in carpentry, cooking, sewing, cultivation, and other skills that could provide livelihood. These schools were thought to be "the most promising
agency . . . for improving the unsatisfactory conditions under which our
peasants live and converting them from a liability into an asset" (U.S. Department of War, 1930: 105). In the early 1930s a gender-based curriculum offered boys courses in agriculture, carpentry, and shoe repair while girls were
instructed in home economics and social work. Both boys and girls took industrial arts courses; for girls this meant primarily needlework. The purpose
of this curriculum was to train the rural poor to eke out a bare living on the
margins of the economy as independent commodity producers. If they were
fortunate enough to generate a surplus, they could enter the market as petty
commodity producers.
The rationale for this curriculum reveals much about the role of public education in developing human resources in light of the disastrous labor market conditions. The objective of the manual training and industrial trades was
to "improve the quality of work and establish a standard for the products so
that they may be marketable and thus become a dependable means of support." Shoemaking was directly related to the effort to protect the jibaro from
hookworm since the disease was contracted through the foot. The home
economics curriculum emphasized cooking and sewing and was intended to
teach the girls of the rural districts to do the things that would allow them to
have a "more healthful and happy life with an appreciation for their homes"
(U.S. Department of War, 1929: 390). Agricultural instruction consisted primarily of gardening with the aim of raising food crops so that families might
be able to meet some of their nutritional needs. By participating in the petty
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commodity sector. employed workers could supplement their meager earnings from salaried work. The desperate need to impmn:' sanitation and reduce the spread of contagious diseases prompted the curriculum in physical
education and hygiene.
The educational curriculum reflected the bias of the p;ttriarchally constituted social system of the United States. While Puerto Rico was experiencing
\Vrenching economic dislocations, public school authorities employed the
school system tore-inscribe women's reproductive role in the male-centered
family. The gcndered curriculum socialized youngsters into understanding
and accepting the legitimacy of a gender-based division of labor within the
systL·m of generalized commodity production that \\as rapidly unfolding.
Women were trained in activities and household tasks related to the economic reproduction of the family unit that were not necessarily required in
the formal labor sector.
When the war in Europe \·irtually halted it'i lace and embroidery expotts,
manufacturers in the United States increased production, and many turned
to Puerto Rico. where labor was abundant and cheap. In 1918, the needlework industry was targeted by the Department of Education for its capacity
to employ huge numbers of unemployed young women. Jose' Rosario, an official in the depattment, pointed to the "pressing duty of the rural schools to
train the country girls to do this work in a more efficient way and so increase
their income and the income of Porto Rico .. (Rosario, n.d.: 691-92). School
officials held conferences with manufacturers and dL·signecl special needlework courses that met the manufacturers' specifications. Private schools
were also accredited in needlework, dra\\'n work, and embroidery (U.S. Department of War, 1923: 182-83). By 1920, projected demand for skilled workers who were "expert in needlework" exceeded supply, and the legislature
authorized hiring additional instructors in those municipalities where the
prospects of employment were most htvorable. Throughout the 1920s. demand for this skilled but very low-paid labor held steady. In 1931 the federal
government financed vocational training in Puerto Rico and declared that
"the principal emphasis will he laid upon training for jobs in the needle
trades which are dominant industries in Porto Rico" (Society for the Advancement of Education, 1931: 558-59 J. \Xromen constituted by far the majority of the labor in needlework, and their work, despite miserable pay, was
skilled and demanding. The schools not only prepared women for incorporation into gender-segmented lahor markets but sustained the needlework
industry by providing fresh contingents of cheap female labor trained spccificall y for it.
As an instrument for the dissemination of an imperial ideology the school
system appears to h~l\ e been at best pat1ially successful. Rarely was more
than half of the eligible student population enrolled in any giwn year, and
mandatory instruction was seldom enfotTL'cl past the fourth year. Privately
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commissioned as \H~ll as government studies documentl'd the failure of the
school system to transmit knowll'dge and training in areas critical to economic growth and societal well-being. The needlework industry represents
one of the few sectors in which the hoped-for synergy between the public
school system and industry vvas realized.
The emergence of a vocal anti-American movement was a telling indication of the failure of the colonizing mission. Although the Nationalist party
never posed a threat to U.S. colonial control, its violent activities galvanized
the nation. The party's charismatic leader, Pedro Alhizu Campo.s. threatened
the legitimacy of coloni:d rule and attracted more adhl'rents to the nationalist cause than the locd l'lites were willing to tolerate.
The Nation:dist party emerged as a militant reaction to the corruption and
complacency of the Socialist and Republican Party coalition that controlled
the legislature during the 1920s and early 1930s. But Albizu Campos directed
his most vituperative diatribes against the l.J.S. government and absentee corporations. He lashed out against the colonialism that was impoverishing his
people. and the local capitalist class that had amassed fortunes from this exploitation (Albizu Campos, 1979: 43). He imbued the nationalist movement
with radicalism that resonated with ever-growing numbers of Puerto Ricans.
He declared, "North American interests occupy a great part of our lands and
are owners of almost eighty pucent of the total wealth of the country; by
virtue of this forced feudalism the majority of the electorate of this country
are made dependc·nt on its will" (Albizu Campos. 1l):)O: 15).
By the earlv 1930s it seemed that the very process of Americmization was
generating its ~mtithesis. till· formation of a nationalist vision of Puerto Rican
identity and the emergence of political forces committed to promoting this
identity. Unrestrained market forces had precipitated a social and economic
crisis that persuaded the Democratic administration of Franklin Roosevelt in
the early 1930s to intervene to save its crumbling Caribbean colonial possession. The modernization of the colonial state"s coercive capabilities and its
emphasis on protecting the rights of private property were elements of the
colonizing mission. But opposition to the colonial order intensified vit1ually
in unison with the growing social and economic immiseration. Opponents of
the regime pointed to the growing contradiction between an official ideology of democracy and economic fairness and a colonial policy that increasingly relied on coercion and compulsion to enforce the mle of b\v.

THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE COLONIAL SUBJECT
The arri\·al of an alien power that usurps a people"s sm crcignry is always
traumatic for the colonized nation and historically has proven to be a
wrenching and violent process. While the U.S. invasion and annexation of
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Puerto Rico did not precipitate a social uprising or bloody confrontation between the colonizers and the indigenous peoples, it was a traumatic e\-ent.
The speed and depth of Puerto Rico's transformation into a highly lucrative
export platform for U.S. corporations ultimately destroyed a people's way of
life. The change in sovereignty not only eradicated the sources of power and
privilege of Puerto Rico's traditional political elite but also elevated to prominence other political actors who subscribed to the colonial enterprise.
U.S. officials gained enough support from key sectors to institute widespread institutional changes. Domestic capital and some of the professional
strata that stood to gain under the new sovereignty worked closely with the
colonial authorities (sec Quintero 1\ivera, 1')88). These sectors aspired to
form a lW\V economic and social order in which they would assume the
perquisites of titular political authority. In the process they hoped to displace
the traditional landed elite that had assumed prominence during the waning
years of Spanish dominion. Support for U.S. sovereignty extended to other
sectors. ln a society wracked by unemployment, hunger. and disease. those
fortunate enough to be employed by the colonial regime had privileged status. Puerto Rican participation in the colonial administration served to legitimate metropolitan rule and was used by ll.S. officials as evidence that
Puerto 1\icans had consented to their own subordination. Despite these
changes in the class composition and domestic political configuration, resistance did emerge to impede the U.S. effort to Americanize the Puerto Rican people.
The system of public education that had been heralded as the jewel of the
Americanization program failed to achieve many of its objectives. Rather
than preparing an educated, skilled, and loyal colonial subject, the school
system was called upon to instruct the impoverished rural population in the
skills they needed to sutYive. Capitalist development in Puerto Rico did not
generate a significant demand for skilled labor. \Vhat the sugar and tobacco
corporations needed was an unskilled, cheap, and complacent labor forcethe younger and healthier, the better. Puerto Rico's experience under colonial management and capitalist de\ elopment exposed the cupidity submerged in the ideological discourse that equated economic grovvth \vith
political democracy and social equity.
The experiments in social engineering conducted in the great national laboratory th:tt policy makers called Puerto Rico did not conYert Puerto Ricans
into a bicultural and bilingual people. Many of the bro;tcler goals of Antericanization went unrealized. Admittedly, many of these goals were often illdefined and grandiose, but the implied objective was to pacify the Puerto Ricans into accepting the superiority of the U.S. polity and its natural right to
rule their lives. Although conflicting policy objectives :md political aspirations in the federal government led to inconsistent and contradictory initiatives, the multiple instances of resistance to colonial authority revealed the
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durability of l'ulTto Rican national identity and the resiliency of its cultural
sovereignty. Americanization was not only a generalized project to assimilate
and transform an inferior people and its institutions but also a celebratory
discourse on the power and wisdom of the American political system and
American business. The hesitancy of Pue11o Ricans to embrace this myth was
a sobering realization to U.S. empire builders.

NOTES
1. Technicallv the llnitnl SL!tes did not have sovereignty over Cuba. l :nder Article
1 of the Treaty of Paris ( liNHl Spain relinquished son'reignry over C:uh~1. and the
United States \\·as to ";Jssume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result ti·om the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property."
2. For a lcngtlw examination of the complex and varied responses of different sectors in Puerto Rico to U.S. colonial policy, see Cahan (1999).
3. This idea of the concordance between dcrnocracy, market economies, and trade
\vas a centerpiece of President George W. Bush's message at the 2001 Summit of the
Americas: "Open trade reinforces the habit of liberty that sustains democracy over the
long haul. Free enterprise requires lihetty and enlarges liberty." Bush Comments at Summit of the Americas Working Session, April 21, 2001. http:!/usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/
sutnmit/<Jpening.htm.
4. Typified by Senator Albert Beveridge's statement: "And of all our race he has
marked the AmLTi,·an people as His chosen nation to finallv lead in the regeneration
of the world" (quoted in Smith 1997: 431).
5. According to Isaac lkrkson, in his 1920 study on the Americanization of Europeans in the continental l'nitcd States, "Newcomers from foreign lands must as
quickly diYest themseln~s of their old characteristics, ~llld through intermarriage and
complete taking ()\t'r of the language customs, hope.', aspirations of the American
type obliterate all ethnic distinctions. They must utterly forget the land of their birth
and completely lose from their memory all recollection of its traditions in a singleminded adherence to American life in all its aspects'' (Berkson, 1920).
6. For example, William Hunt, Puerto Rico's second appointed governor, believed
that "every effort must be made not only to teach new doctrines and ideas, but at the
same time to destroy the prejudices. ignorance and the false teachings of the past"
(U.S. Department of State, 1904: 13).
7. See Trias Monge (1991: esp. l"i4-161) for the noted jurist's views on why the legal
changes were effected so quicklv and failed to provoke notable resistance. The opposition Federal p:111\' boycotted the elections of 1900 in pa11 because Governor Allen did
nothing to ldt the campaign of physical intimidation against the party's candidates.
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